Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the
Human Condition. Ed. Harold W. Baillie and Timothy K. Casey (Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 2005), x + 422pp, £17.05 pb.
Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement. By Nicholas Agar (Oxford,
Malden MA: Blackwell, 2004), viii + 205pp, £55.00 hb.
The history of eugenics is getting tricky. Once regarded as an initially idealistic
concept that degenerated into the monstrous Nazi race hygiene project or into an
American sterilization assault against the disadvantaged and racially “inferior”,
eugenics was deemed to have died after the Second World War, utterly discredited by
better biological science and more enlightened social ideas. However recent research
has shown that eugenics was more variegated than once thought — there were leftist
and “reform” eugenists as well as “mainline” or reactionary eugenists, with dedicated
opposition coming more from liberal and religious quarters. Ingrained into
contemporary structures and social issues such as demography, welfare, race and
gender, eugenics proved more resilient and widespread than previously thought.
Historians were slow to recognize its pervasive influence in Scandinavia, Latin
America and Asia, where local variants evolved as adaptations to local culture and
conditions. And it has persisted to the present day. In welfarist Scandinavia, eugenics has been repackaged as reproductive autonomy or “medical” measures.1 In Communist China it is alive and well in sterilization programmes and the one baby policy.2 More than this, critics allege, it has been resurrected in the “new genetics” of recent times.
Geneticists have historically been strong supporters of eugenics as a way of scientifically improving (now read “enhancing”) the genetic quality of the human race. As I have argued in another place, during the inter-war period they failed properly to scrutinize methodologies and data used to support sterilization of mental defectives,3 and it is contendable that social and ideological factors have continued to play a role — alongside epistemic factors associated with the expansion of genetic knowledge — in the motivations of biological scientists, although of course they routinely avoid the term “eugenics”.
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Response to Robin Derricourt’s Review of my book Grafton Elliot Smith, Egyptology and the Diffusion of Culture in Antiquity 86 (2012):569-570
I thank Robin Derricourt for his flattering reference to me in his review of my book. However I would contend against some of his judgments on Elliot Smith. He claims that, with respect to his diffusionist approach and Egypt, Elliot Smith essentially announced a grand world view, and then selected data that fitted this view. After reading in detail his writings and correspondence, it became clear to me that Elliot Smith was in fact genuinely trying to apply the same scientific principles that he had been using in his medical and evolutionary research to the issue of cultural diffusion. This was certainly the view of the eminent zoologist Solly Zuckerman, who knew him well. As I say in my book: “The grotesque caricatures and stereotypes need to end. Elliot Smith was a serious scientist in all the fields he tackled. It is grossly unfair to excise his ethnological work as some sort of aberration. In this field he devoted enormous energy to collecting as much reliable data as was then available. And he applied his formidable intelligence to it. He put forward innovative hypotheses based on such observed evidence. As a scientist he was fully aware that such hypotheses would survive only until they were disproven… If he sometimes speculated beyond his data, he did so with the purpose of stimulating debate and more intensive research” (p.126). There was in fact, as documented in my book, considerable respect (not “nearly universal criticism”) for Elliot Smith’s diffusionist theory in his early years, even from Malinowski. Also shown is the way academic opposition mounted with time, partly of course for legitimate epistemic reasons, but also because of professional rivalries and territoriality, and nationalistic factors (especially from America). As new paradigms such as Functionalism became triumphant (helped enormously by Malinowski beating Elliot Smith in the fight for Rockefeller funding), many of the fertile issues raised by Elliot Smith and co-diffusionists such as W. H. R. Rivers and W. J. Perry were basically side-stepped and never seriously scrutinised. As I tried to indicate in my Afterword, some of these themes are now being seriously researched once more, although naturally from modern stances and not – as the reviewer rightly comments – from Elliot Smith’s total diffusionist paradigm (and often in ignorance of his work, as that was effectively excluded from curricula after World War 2).
As an historian, I would suggest that it might be salutary for archaeologists and anthropologists to read more about the history of their discipline and past debates, not least because the past illuminates themes such as cultural intrusion into epistemic issues, as well as the perils of exclusive inwardness.
Emeritus Professor of History
University of Queensland, Australia